This study identifies transparency measures and procedures that could be applied to the process of High Explosive (HE) removal and destruction during warhead dismantlement.
INTRODUCTION
With in the context of the Helsinki Summit Agreements, both the United States and the Russian Federation committed to "measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads . . . . ". To help achieve a better understand of those objectives within the Russian Federation, Sandia National Laboratories under the auspices of the DOES Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (NN-42) Russian Lab to Lab Program, initiated a series of contracts with the Russian Nuclear Institutes to examine the topic of Warhead Dismantlement and Transparency.
The primary contributor to the High Explosive detection and destruction analysis and technology development was the Zababakhin Russian Federal Nuclear Center of Technical Physics (VNHTF). 
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Results are appropriate for a single DOE SNF canister. Specific facilities, equipment, canister internal structures, and scenarios for handling, storage, and transportation have not yet been defined and are not evaluated in this analysis. Because these details are not yet available, results tie not considered fully validated and are not suitable for establishing operational criticality safety controls. In addition, fmil DOE SNF canister or Waste Package design, operational considerations, or facility configumtions could further restrict the canister loading. A complete criticality safety evaluation, including full validation and contingency and accident analyses, must be completed before Peach Bottom fuel is loaded into the DOE SNF canister.
The analysis assumes that the DOE SNF canister is designed so that it maintains reasonable geometric integrity. Parameters important to the results are the canister outer diameter, inner diameter, and wall thickness. These parameters are assumed to have nominal dimensions of 45.7-cm (18.O-in.), 43.815-cm (17.25-in.) , and 0.953-cm (0.375-in.), respectively.
Calculations assumed bare Peach Bottom fuel elements in the small-diameter, 456.9-cm-long DOE SNF canister. Assuming beginning-of-life 235Uand maximum end-of-life 233U,the calculated results are: 15 intact elements in the DOE SNF canister, &ff + 20 = 0.884; 15 elements in degraded condition in the co-disposal waste package,~ff + 20 = 0.977; 14 elements in degraded condition in the co-disposal waste package, &ff + 2G = 0.954. If 50 kg of iron in the form of geothite is added,~ff + 20 = 0.883 for 15 elements in degraded condition in the codisposal waste package.
Based on these results, the recommended fissile loading for the DOE SNF canister is 13 Peach Bottom fuel elements if no internal steel is present, and 15 Peach Bottom fuel elements if credit is taken for internal steel. This page intentionally blank. Table 1 . Table 2 . Table 3 . Table 4 . Table 5 . Table 6 . Table 7 . Table 8 . Table 9 . 
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Description
Peaeh Bottom Fuel Elements3
Peach Bottom Unit 1 was a prototype high-temperature gas-cooled reactor. It used graphite moderation with highly enriched uranium-thorium carbide I%el. It operated from March 1966 to October 1974 using two fuel cores. Core 1 had a higher fissile loading and 450 days of exposure. Core 2 had 900 days of exposure. Each core used four types of standard fiel elements: I -heavy rhodium II -light rhodium; III -light rhodium with poison; and IV -heavy thorium/light uranium. A nominal core loading contained 54 Type I elements, 564 Type II, 84 Type III, and 102 Type IV.
Cores 1 and 2 eaeh had 36 instrumented fuel elements. These looked very much like the standard fuel elements, with the exception of the bottom connector. The modified bottom connector does not have a notched end like the standard bottom connector. All instrumented elements had thermocouples; some were equipped with acoustic thermometers. Instrumented : fuel elements have the same fuel loadings as standard fiel elements and were used in place of standard fuel elements.
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A total of 34 test elements were irradiated. These differed from the standard fuel eIements both in geometry and in material loadings. Test elements are not assessed in this preliminary analysis.
Peach Bottom fuel elements for both cores are stored at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. Core 1 fuel elements are individually packaged, and stored in canisters at facility CPP-749. Core 2 fuel elements are stored in canisters in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (lI?SF) at building CPP-603. Because the IFSF storage canisters are only 335-cm (1 l-ft.) long, the top 45.7-cm (18-in.) of the upper reflector assembly was cut off before the Core 2 elements were placed into storage.
A Peach Bottom standard fiel element is pictured in Figure 1 .3 It is 365.76-cm (144-in.) long and 8.89-cm (3.5 in.) in diameter. It is constructed almost entirely of graphite, weighing about 41 kg (90 lbs). Axially, the fiel region is nearly centered along the fbel element.
An outer l-cm (0.4-in.) thick sleeve contains the fuel region. The sleeve is low-permeability graphite with a density of 1.90 g/cm3. It extends axially beyond the fieI region in both directions, for a total length of 292-cm (115-in.), connecting the fuel region with graphite reflector assemblies. The upper reflector assembly is threaded and cemented into the sleeve. The lower reflector assembly includes a solid lower reflector, an internal fission product trap assembly, and a bottom connector. At the bottom of the fission product trap is a small (5 gram) stainless steel screen. A 15-gram silicon braze connects the lower edge of the sleeve to the bottom connector.
Inside the fuel region of the sleeve are annular compacts of uranium and thorium carbide particles in a graphite matrix, formed by warm-press and sintering. The Core 1 fuel particles have a single coating of pyrolytic carbon. Core 2 fuel particles were fabricated with a lowdensity inner coating and isotropic outer coating of pyrolytic carbon.
Thirty of these fuel compacts are stacked on a central 4.445-cm (1.75-in.) diameter spine of 1.85 g/cm3 graphite. The Type 3 element spines are unique in that the spine is annular, containing burnable poison compacts. These spines have a 2.26-cm (0.89 -in.) inner diameter. The poison compacts are 5-cm (2-in.) long rods of zirconium diboride in a graphite matrix.
While Core 1 and Core 2 elements have the same outer dimensions, the fuel compacts differ slightly. The Core 1 fiel compacts have axial grooves and are slightly shorter. The Core 2 fuel compacts have small slots in the compact ends. Due to the small variation in compact height, the overall fuel region length is 227.076-cm for a Core 1 element, 228.600-cm for a Core 2 element. The difference in fiel region length is compensated for~mthe upper reflector assembly.
Four types of fuel compacts were made for each core -standard, heavy rhodium, light rhodium, and heavy thorium. Compacts and spines were assembled in several different combinations to create the four different types of fuel elements. The total beginning-of-life (BOL) loadings for each of the fuel element types are given in Table 1 . The uranium and thorium loadings are uniform throughout the fuel region of an element. A uranium isotopic breakdown was not available' for the Core 2 elements. Some post-irradiation/end-of-Iife (EOL) values are specified for the Core I and Core 2 fbel. Fuel element average and maximum values are given in Table 2 . EOL values for the total core are given in Table 3 . The set of DOE SNF canisters is based on a single design concept that includes radial and axial symmetry, such that it can be handled from either end. The designs differ by canister diameter and length. The two diameters are 45.7-cm (18.00-in.) and 61.O-cm (24.00-in.), the lengths 299.9-cm (118.1 l-in.) and 456.9-cm (179.92-in.). The large-diameter canister is not examined in this analysis.
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The shorter canister is too short to accommodate Peach Bottom fuel elements. The smalldiameter, 456.9-cm-long canister has a minimum active storage length of 41 1.7-cm (162.09 in.). The canister walls are a nominal 0.953-cm (0.375-in.) thick type 316L stainless steel. Each end features a dished head and lifting rings. Impact plates of 5.O-cm (2.00-in.) thick carbon steel are placed in the upper and lower heads at the time of fuel loading.
5-HLWAOE Spent Fuel Long Co-disuosal Waste Packages
The 5-HLW/DOE spent fuel long co-disposal waste package is intended for disposal in the national repository. It has a central support tube that can accommodate a small-diameter (45.7-cm diameter) DOE SNF canister. The central tube is surrounded by five equally spaced storage positions, each of which holds a High Level Waste (HLW) glass-pour canister. The co-disposal waste package has an outer diameterof212-cm and overall length of 536.7-cm, including 22.5-cm skirts at each end. The outermost corrosion allowance shell is constructed of carbon steel, with 10-cm thick walls and bottom and an 1l-cm thick lid. The inner corrosion resistant shell is made of Alloy C-22 (a nickel alloy), with 2-cm thick walls and bottom and a 2.5-cm The total HLW canister weight is 4200 kg, with the waste glass occupying
Requirements Documentation
The Preliminary Design Specification for the DOE SNF canisters asserts that the SNF will be loaded into the canister such that criticality concerns during the canister's design life will be precluded. This can be achieved by proper fissile loading limits, by properly designed internals, or by a combination of both. The specification also states that for criticality concerns, the DOE SNF canister must be capable of maintaining reasonable geometric integrity only.
This analysis is preliminary in nature. As such, standarci quality assurance criteria for a typical criticality safety evaluation do not specifically apply, but are invoked voluntarily where appropriate. Criticality safety criteria are contained in national standards ANSI/ANS-8. 1,6-8.7,7 and -8. 19,8standard DOE-STD-3007-93,9 and 10 CFR parts 60, 61,71, and 72. The analysis is required to be well documented, have a validated calculation method and verified software code, and to be independently reviewed. To be considered well documented, an analysis must be reported in sufficient detail to allow independent judgment and reproduction of results by a qualified criticality safety analyst. A documented criticality safety analysis is required to demonstrate fissile systems will be subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions. Some criteria require limits based on validated calculations not exceed a calculated km of 0.95. These standard quality assurance requirements are consistent and compatible with applicable criteria of DOELRW-0333P, Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (QARD) for the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW).2 The criticality safety analysis summarized in this report is well documented, was conducted with verified software code, and was independently reviewed. The calculation method was validated only partially, but validation was sufilcient to provide some confidence in results.
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Methodology
Calculational Codes and Cross Sections
The calculations for this evaluation were performed using MCNP 4B2, with the ENDF/B-V continuous energy cross section library.l" Calculations were carried out on a networked system of Hewlett-Packard 9000 series workstations under version 10.20 of the HPUX UNIX operating system. MCNP is a generalized geometry Monte Carlo transport code qualified to comply with QARD requirements.*1 It is considered by the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program to be transferred software.]2 The Iocal copy of this software and its accompanying data Iibraries are maintained by RW-qualified personnel.
Validation
Complete validation for this analysis could not be accomplished because specific facilities, equipment, and scenarios for handling, storage, and transportation have not yet been defined. Several validation cases for the Peach Bottom fuel are included here to provide some confidence in results. It is recommended that, in addition to the experiments presented below, critical experiments with thoria-urania fuel from Argonne National Laboratory13 be added to the validation. Others should be added as appropriate.
The critical experiments used for initial validation efforts are documented in the International Handbook of Evaluuted Criticali~Safety Benchmurk Experiments.14'1 5>16*17'* 8 Results indicate that if a bias is necessary, it will not be signtilcant to the extent that it would change the conclusions of this report. All validation cases were run under the RW-qualified version of MCNP with ENDF/B-V cross sections.
Discussion of Contingencies
A discussion of contingencies is not included in this evaluation because specific facilities, equipment, and scenarios for handling, storage, and transportation have not yet been defined. A contingency analysis must be performed when this information is available.
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Evaluation & Results
Description of Model
The Peach Bottom fuel element was modelled as a simple cylinder with an outer diameter of 8.89-cm and three axial regions. The axial dimensions were modelled as given in Figure 1 . The lower and upper regions were modelled as solid graphite at a density of 1.90 g/cm3. Nongraphite parts were ignored due to their small size and distance from the element fuel portion.
The fuel region was modelled as concentric cylinders. The sleeve was 1.016-cm-thick graphite at 1.90 g/cm3. The fuel compacts were modelled as a single annulus, with an outer diameter of 6.858-cm and inner diameter of 4.445-cm. The fuel ammlus compositions are shown in Table 4 according to fuel element type. The isotopic mass values are generally average EOL, with the exception of 233Uand 235U,which are maximum EOL. The derivation of these values is shown in the detailed analysis. 1 The neutron absorber *03Rhwas conservatively omitted from the model. With 1°3Rhomitted, the fbel annulus compositions for element Types 1-3 were identical.
The spine was graphite at 1.85 g/cm3. It was modeiled as a cylinder for l%eltypes 1,2, and 4, and as an annulus for fuel type 3. Type 3 fuel elements had an annular spine and a 2.261 -cm-diameter central poison rod. The poison rod com osition is given in Table 5 . The derivation of these values is shown in the detailed analysis. ? Atom densities for materials were determined in accordance with RW guidance.lg
Consideration was given to possible water intrusion into the I%elelements. For simplicity it was assumed that void space in the element would be replaced by water for "saturated" fuel. The void space for a dry element was approximately 2070. The DOE SNF canister model closely follows the design discussed in Section 2. The model differs slightly from the current design in canister length. The model used an overall length of 456.87-cm and interior usable length of 414.45-cm. These slightly larger values are based on an earlier design. Several calculations were done to assess the importance of the canister walls and ends. Results are given in Table 6 . It can be concluded that the canister ends, and the slight decrease in the designed canister length, do not affect the calculated~ff of the canister. The canister wall thickness is important, but so long as the wall thickness is at least half of the nominal value, the impact on calculated~ff is small. The canister material is stainless steel type 316L. 
Calculations
This section summarizes calculations and results. A full presentation of calculations is contained in the detaded analysis. 1 AIl calculations used 30-cm of water reflection. Theoretically, the maximum number of Peach Bottom fuel elements that can fit inside the DOE SNF canister is 19. This assumes bare elements with essentially no spacing. It is depicted as the "regular arrangement" in Figure 2 . As indicated by the figure, for the 19 elements to be modelled in a triangular-pitched array, the can diameter must be increased. Most cases used 19 elements. When a minimal allowance is included to accommodate deviations in element diameter and straightness, the maximum number of elements that can fit into the DOE SNF canister decreases to 14 or 15 elements. The array used for calculations with 15 elements is also shown in Figure 2 . Triamzular-uitched array of elements. This array was modelled without the DOE SNF canister.
First a spacing study using the 19-element array was done. Cases were run both with and without water between fuel elements. The amount of water in the fuel elements was varied in 5% increments, from dry to saturation (-20%). The spacing between elements was then varied from O-to 4-cm. The maximum calculated~results are summarized in Table 7 .
Second, beginning with the fully flooded case, the density of the water between fuel elements was decreased. The elements remained saturated and touching throughout. No local minima or maxima in calculated &ff were observed as water density was decreased down to zero. Again, the most reactive configuration was the fulIy flooded array. water density in the co-disposal waste package, with the DOE SNF canister filly flooded. Calculated kff was greatest for the DOE SNF canister filly flooded, and the co-disposal waste package dry. Calculated~ff was also obtained for the 15-element triangular-pitched array under the same conditions. Demaded fuel region. These calculations used either the explicit model of the DOE SNF canister (in the co-disposal waste package), or a simple can of identical diameter, wall thickness, and length (with water reflection only). The can was modelled lying on its side, with the three axial regions of the fuel element maintained. Graphite and water were mixed homogeneously for the upper and lower regions. FOI:the central portion, fbel region materials -sleeve, fiel annulus, and spine -were mixed homogeneously 'with water. The amount of water in the I%elregion was reduced by decreasing the diametrical height of the mixture, while conserving the mass of fiel region materials. The vacated space above the mixture was filled with water. Cases were run for 13 to 19 elements. Maximum calculated ff results for each set of runs is given in Table 9 . In the co-disposal canister, 15 degraded elements yields kfi + 2CJof 0.95. Composition Sensitivity. As indicated previously, the composition as modelled for calculations included average EOL values for all isotopes except 233Uand 235U,which were maximum EOL values. This is not necessarily the most conservative composition when evaluating fuels with burnup and breeding. BOL 235U,EOL 233U,and EOL Pu loadings are most conservative and easiest to defend. Using the 15-element array given in Figure 2 , a comparison of various compositions was made. Results are shown in Table 10 . These indi~ate that the compositi~n as modelled for calculations, #1, is conservative compared to #2 and #3. However, compositions #4 and #5 are clearly more reactive. For 15 intact eIements, calculated~ff well below 0.90 for all compositions. For 15 elements in degraded condition, composition #5 yields calculated~ff greater than 0.95. The geologic repository calculations typically take credit for the presence of geothite for fuel in degraded condition.5 Composition #6 shows that if credit is taken for 50 kg of iron from internal steel, in the form of geothite, and its displacement of water, calculated~ff decreases considerably. Internal steel may also decrease the calculated~ff for the intact elements.
A calculation was done using composition #5 and 14 elements in degraded condition in the waste package. This yielded calculated~ff of 0.954. Because internal structures for the DOE SNF canister have not yet been defined, these results indicate that the fissile loading limit for the DOE SNF canister is 13 Peach Bottom elements. . The DOE SNF canister is designed so that it maintains reasonable geometric integrity.
q No more than 14 Peach Bottom elements can be loaded into the DOE SNF canister.
. The nominal DOE SNF canister outer diameter is 45.7-cm (18.O-in.).
. The nominal DOE SNF canister inner diameter is 43.815-cm (17.25-in.).
. The nominal DOE SNF canister wall thickness is 0.953-cm (0.375-in.).
Based on this analysis, DOE SNF canisters loaded with Peach Bottom fhel must be handled, transported, and stored such that interaction with other fissile material is precluded.
Summary & Conclusions
Calculations were completed for Peach Bottom fuel elements in the small-diameter, 456.9-cm-long DOE SNF canister. The fiel elements were bare. No canister internals were considered. The maximum number of fiel elements that could fit into the canister is theoretically 19, but realistically only 14 or 15. Assuming BOL 235Uand maximum EOL '3U, the calculated results are: 15 intact elements in the DOE SNF canister,~ff + 20 = 0.884; 15 elements in degraded condition in the co-disposal waste package,~ff + 2cJ= 0.977; 14 elements in degraded condition in the co-disposal waste package,~ff + 2a = 0.954. If 50 kg of iron in the form of geothite is added, &ff + 20 = 0.883 for 15 elements in degraded condition in the co-disposal waste package.
Based on these results, the recommended fissile loading for the DOE SNF canister is 13 Peach Bottom fuel elements if no internal steel is present, and 15 Peach Bottom fuel elements if credit is taken for internal steel.
These calculations assume that the DOE SNF canister maintains reasonable geometric integrity during loading, handling, and drop configurations, depending primarily upon the canister wall thickness. This analysis does not conclusively address all loading, handling, and drop configurations, since these have not yet been defined.
